lukasandClaude Opus 4.8
4e077f1a37
Backend foundation for the plugin platform (SPEC §11), Phases 1-3.
Phase 1 — SDK + loader:
- app/plugins/types.py: frozen Plugin/UiManifest/Slot/Page/JobSpec contract.
- app/plugins/sdk.py: sdk(name) facade — the only app.* import allowed for plugins
(scoped session, plugin.{name}.* publish, blob, outbox, settings, SSRF http_get, KV, enqueue).
- app/plugins/loader.py: entry-point discovery (webmail.plugins), hook forwarding
(API + worker), router mounting at /api/plugins/{name}, ui-manifest aggregation.
- plugin_kv core table (migration 0013) + GET /api/plugins/ui-manifest.
Phase 2 — non-removable core plugins + DB-enforced privacy:
- builtin flag (calendar/contacts will be builtin=True; uninstall refuses them).
- RLS per-user isolation on plg_* tables: least-privilege webmail_plugin role
(migration 0014), plugin_session(user_id) sets LOCAL ROLE + app.current_user_id,
rls.enable_rls() (ENABLE+FORCE RLS + USING/WITH CHECK policy). Mail untouched.
- Per-plugin Alembic runner (shared env, dedicated version table) + install/uninstall
--drop-data CLI; skeleton fixture proves install -> run -> uninstall --drop-data
leaves zero residue (§12 M3 acceptance).
Phase 3 — plugin jobs (§11.2):
- JobSpec registered as arq function plg.{plugin}.{func} + cron (5-field parser);
singleton=True guarded by a per-(plugin,user) Redis lock; wired onto the shared
interactive worker.
Gates: ruff, mypy --strict (94 files + tests), full suite 326 passed. RLS isolation,
migration round-trip, and singleton lock covered by tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rcj3TpydMTzTSmU7kunzf8
45 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
45 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
"""RLS-enforced database access for plugins (SPEC §11.1 + privacy hardening).
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``plugin_session(user_id)`` yields a normal SQLAlchemy session whose transaction
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has been dropped to the least-privilege :data:`~app.plugins.rls.PLUGIN_ROLE` and
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bound to the per-user RLS context. Both are set with transaction-local scope
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(``SET LOCAL`` / ``set_config(..., is_local=true)``), so they auto-revert on
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commit/rollback and cannot leak across pooled connections.
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Because the role is non-superuser / non-owner / NOBYPASSRLS, the row-level policy
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from :mod:`app.plugins.rls` is actually enforced: a plugin query that forgets to
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filter ``user_id`` still returns only the current user's rows, and it cannot write
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rows for anyone else (policy ``WITH CHECK``).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import uuid
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from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from sqlalchemy import text
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.db import get_sessionmaker
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from app.plugins.rls import PLUGIN_ROLE
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@asynccontextmanager
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async def plugin_session(user_id: uuid.UUID) -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
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"""A transactional session scoped to ``user_id`` under RLS (SPEC §11.1)."""
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async with get_sessionmaker()() as session:
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try:
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# Bind the RLS user context first (while still the privileged role), then
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# drop into the restricted role for the rest of the transaction.
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await session.execute(
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text("SELECT set_config('app.current_user_id', :uid, true)"),
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{"uid": str(user_id)},
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)
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await session.execute(text(f"SET LOCAL ROLE {PLUGIN_ROLE}"))
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yield session
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await session.commit()
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except Exception:
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await session.rollback()
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raise
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