Plugin settings pages were stacked at the bottom of Settings -> Accounts, which
put antispam's thresholds and lists under a heading about mail accounts. Each
`settings.page` now gets its own entry in the Settings nav: "Antispam filtering"
and "Mail filters".
Slot gains an optional `title` for this — the host needs a label when it gives a
slot an area of its own, and falls back to the plugin name. PluginSlot gains an
optional `plugin` filter so a host can render one plugin's bundle rather than
every binding for a slot name.
Wording: the app calls that folder Spam (i18n `nav.spam`), so the plugin's copy
now does too — "filed into Spam", "Move to Spam", "marked as spam". The IMAP
special-use stays `junk`, which is what the protocol calls it; only what the
user reads changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018SqJYt7jD7oUEkoY68sBZo
Dev compose gains rspamd + redis-rspamd, matching production. The dev API and
worker run on the host rather than in the compose network, so the ports are
published on loopback and RSPAMD_URL points at 127.0.0.1 — documented in
.env.example.
Contacts now cap a verdict at "banner": mail from someone in the user's address
book is never moved to Junk. Capped rather than exempted, because the way this
fails in practice is a contact's account being compromised and spamming its own
address book — the warning still has value even when the move would be wrong.
An explicit deny rule still wins; that is the user overruling us deliberately.
The lookup reads the contacts plugin's table directly and forgives its absence:
no contacts plugin means no contacts to check, not an error. Addresses are
stored as the user typed them, so both sides are lower-cased rather than relying
on the jsonb containment index, and secondary addresses in the emails array
count as well as the primary. It runs only when the verdict would otherwise be a
move, so the common path pays nothing.
Also fixes a test that asserted stats degrade "without an engine" by relying on
no engine being present — true until this commit. It now simulates the absence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018SqJYt7jD7oUEkoY68sBZo
message.new fires for imported history as well as new arrivals, and EventBus
awaits hooks inline. As written, adding an account would have scored every
message in its backfill — filing years-old inbox mail into Junk on the server,
and adding ~70 ms of serialized HTTP per message to the backfill loop (twelve
minutes on a 10k-message account). It is also when the filter is least able to
judge, because Bayes has learned nothing yet.
The envelope now carries account_state, and the hook returns unless it is
"live". The backfill window belongs to the C2 learning bootstrap (§C.5), which
reads that history as training data instead of acting on it.
Tests pin the gating: backfilling accounts are not even read from the blob
store, non-inbox folders are ignored, a live inbox arrival still classifies, and
an unreachable engine still delivers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018SqJYt7jD7oUEkoY68sBZo
Completes phase C1 — until now the plugin classified mail that nobody could see
or steer.
Router (§C.6): settings with merge semantics, allow/deny rules, a per-message
verdict lookup, learn, and stats. Two behaviours worth naming. A banner
threshold above the move threshold is silently capped rather than refused,
because a banner past the move score can never be seen — everything that far up
is already in Junk. And /learn moves the message even when the engine is
unreachable: teaching is best-effort, but filing is what the user actually
asked for.
UI: settings.page (thresholds in plain language, per-account toggles, the two
lists, the privacy switch, activity); message.banner for the uncertain middle,
offering Move to Junk / Not spam / Always trust sender; message.actions with
Spam / Not spam. The banner mounts on every message but renders only for a
`banner` verdict — a spam warning on ordinary mail is worse than no warning.
Bundle serving is allow-listed by filename, so /ui/../hook.py is a 404 rather
than a file read.
Tests cover the defaults, merge semantics, the threshold cap, rule
normalisation and idempotency, stats degrading to empty when Rspamd is absent,
and RLS isolation: one user cannot see another's rules or settings, nor delete a
rule whose id they know.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018SqJYt7jD7oUEkoY68sBZo
Second-pass spam filtering per SPEC Appendix C. The engine is Rspamd in its own
container; this plugin is glue and policy, never a spam engine of its own.
Classification (§C.4) hooks message.new, acts only on inbox arrivals of enabled
accounts, and runs deny list -> allow list -> engine -> thresholds. Every
failure path ends in "deliver normally, unclassified": an unreachable engine, a
missing blob, an account with no Junk folder, a failed verdict write. Nothing
here may delay or lose mail, so no service declares depends_on: rspamd.
Two containers, started with everything else rather than behind a profile:
rspamd, and a redis of its own. The separate redis is not incidental — the app's
redis holds sync leases and arq queues under noeviction, and an ever-growing
Bayes corpus must never be able to fail a job enqueue. This one takes RDB
snapshots and evicts, because its data is derived and retrainable.
Network checks (RBL/SURBL/fuzzy) are off: they leak message-derived hashes and
URLs to third parties, which a self-hosted server's users did not ask for. The
engine makes no outbound connections in the default configuration.
The controller password is generated into .env like MASTER_KEY. It is internal;
humans will reach Rspamd through the admin panel, authenticated as the ordinary
administrator, rather than typing it.
local.d/groups.conf zeroes six SMTP-time symbols — DATE_IN_PAST,
PREVIOUSLY_DELIVERED, HFILTER_HOSTNAME_UNKNOWN, RCVD_NO_TLS_LAST, ARC_NA,
DMARC_NA — and greylisting is disabled. Measured against 398 real delivered
messages, those checks were firing on 44-71% of ordinary mail and pushing 11.3%
of it over the banner threshold; scoring mail at rest for facts true of every
delivered message is simply the wrong question. After: median 3.09 -> 0.70,
p95 7.00 -> 3.40, banner rate 11.3% -> 1.0%. The spec's 12.0/6.0 thresholds were
never the problem and are unchanged. Symbols are zeroed rather than removed so
verdicts stay explainable, and they matter again at the M6 edge (§C.7).
Still to come in C1: the §C.6 router and UI slots. C2 adds the learning loop —
until Bayes is trained, genuine scams and legitimate bulk mail overlap in the
5-8 band and no threshold separates them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018SqJYt7jD7oUEkoY68sBZo
lukasandClaude Opus 5