Files
webmail-client/backend/app/accounts/ssrf.py
T
lukasandClaude Opus 4.8 12a67825cc Sender avatars, PDF password preview, contacts autosave, account-view + Trash/Spam auto-purge, UI polish
Sender avatars (privacy-safe, server-fetched, cached):
- New GET /api/avatar resolves Gravatar (d=404) then the sender domain's favicon
  under the SSRF guard, Redis-cached (hit+miss); gated by SENDER_AVATARS_ENABLED.
  GuardedResponse gains raw bytes. Shown in the mail list, reading pane, People
  panel, and Contacts (overlay that falls back to initials on a miss).

PDF preview:
- Password-protected PDFs now prompt in-place and retry (pdf.js PasswordException),
  with a clear error for other load failures instead of a blank overlay. The
  password is remembered per attachment until the thread is left; clicking the
  field no longer dismisses the overlay.

Contacts:
- Autosave reply recipients: message.sent now carries to/cc (name+email); the
  contacts plugin subscribes and adds any non-contact recipients to the Autosaved
  group. Contact avatars show the gravatar/favicon via /api/avatar.

Mail views / retention:
- Clicking an account shows all its mail except Trash/Spam (was inbox-only).
- Daily cron autopurge_trash_spam permanently deletes Trash/Spam older than
  TRASH_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30; 0 disables) — server EXPUNGE + local rows.

UI polish:
- Ultimo signet logo in the Mail/Calendar/Contacts sidebar header and collapsed
  rail; consistent 11px top margin and vertically-aligned header row across states
  (fixed-size flex icon buttons); SVG favicon on the browser tab.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U72FZiF1W1pb8XxyWBTREA
2026-08-06 19:23:27 +02:00

142 lines
4.6 KiB
Python

"""SSRF-guarded outbound HTTP for autodiscovery (SPEC §10.6).
All autodiscovery HTTP is HTTPS-only, 5 s timeout, response capped at 256 KB, no
off-domain redirects, and the target host must resolve exclusively to public IPs
(reject private/loopback/link-local/reserved ranges). A residual TOCTOU gap
(DNS rebinding between our resolve and httpx's own resolve) is accepted for M1;
a pinned-IP transport can close it later.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import ipaddress
import socket
from dataclasses import dataclass
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
import httpx
HTTP_TIMEOUT = 5.0
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 256 * 1024
class SsrfError(Exception):
"""Raised when a URL fails the SSRF policy (bad scheme, private IP, oversize)."""
def _is_public_ip(ip: str) -> bool:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
return not (
addr.is_private
or addr.is_loopback
or addr.is_link_local
or addr.is_multicast
or addr.is_reserved
or addr.is_unspecified
)
async def _resolve_all(host: str) -> list[str]:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
infos = await loop.getaddrinfo(host, None, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
return [info[4][0] for info in infos]
async def assert_host_is_public(host: str) -> None:
"""Resolve ``host`` and reject if any address is non-public (SPEC §10.6)."""
try:
addresses = await _resolve_all(host)
except socket.gaierror as exc:
raise SsrfError(f"cannot resolve {host}") from exc
if not addresses:
raise SsrfError(f"no addresses for {host}")
for ip in addresses:
if not _is_public_ip(ip):
raise SsrfError(f"{host} resolves to non-public address {ip}")
async def guarded_get(url: str) -> str | None:
"""HTTPS GET with the full SSRF policy applied.
Returns the body text on 200, or ``None`` when the resource is absent
(any non-200 response). Raises :class:`SsrfError` on a policy violation
(bad scheme, private IP, oversize); lets httpx network errors propagate.
"""
parts = urlsplit(url)
if parts.scheme != "https":
raise SsrfError("only https is permitted")
if not parts.hostname:
raise SsrfError("missing host")
await assert_host_is_public(parts.hostname)
async with (
httpx.AsyncClient(
follow_redirects=False, # off-domain redirects are forbidden (§10.6)
timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT,
headers={"User-Agent": "webmail-autodiscovery/1.0"},
) as client,
client.stream("GET", url) as resp,
):
if resp.status_code != 200:
return None
chunks: list[bytes] = []
total = 0
async for chunk in resp.aiter_bytes():
total += len(chunk)
if total > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
raise SsrfError("response exceeds 256 KB cap")
chunks.append(chunk)
return b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8", "replace")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GuardedResponse:
status: int
headers: dict[str, str]
content: bytes
text: str
async def guarded_request(
method: str,
url: str,
*,
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
content: bytes | str | None = None,
auth: tuple[str, str] | None = None,
timeout: float = 15.0, # noqa: ASYNC109 - passed straight to httpx's own timeout
max_bytes: int = 25 * 1024 * 1024,
) -> GuardedResponse:
"""Arbitrary-method HTTPS request under the same SSRF policy as :func:`guarded_get`.
Used by plugins that speak WebDAV/CalDAV/CardDAV (PROPFIND/REPORT/PUT/DELETE) or
fetch ICS feeds. HTTPS-only, public host required, no off-domain redirects, body
capped at ``max_bytes``. ``auth`` is an (user, password) basic-auth pair. Returns
status + headers + body (all statuses; the caller decides what's an error)."""
parts = urlsplit(url)
if parts.scheme != "https":
raise SsrfError("only https is permitted")
if not parts.hostname:
raise SsrfError("missing host")
await assert_host_is_public(parts.hostname)
async with (
httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=False, timeout=timeout, auth=auth) as client,
client.stream(method, url, headers=headers, content=content) as resp,
):
chunks: list[bytes] = []
total = 0
async for chunk in resp.aiter_bytes():
total += len(chunk)
if total > max_bytes:
raise SsrfError("response exceeds size cap")
chunks.append(chunk)
body = b"".join(chunks)
return GuardedResponse(
status=resp.status_code,
headers=dict(resp.headers),
content=body,
text=body.decode("utf-8", "replace"),
)