Files
webmail-client/backend/app/identity/service.py
T
lukasandClaude Opus 5.5 165442d897 Logo in system mail; "don't ask for the 2FA code on this device"
System mail: the password-reset email (and the admin panel's test email) now
opens with the Ultimo logo, centered. It is a PNG rendered from
icons/ultimo-logo.svg and embedded in the message (multipart/related, cid:),
so it shows where remote images are blocked and in clients that do not
render SVG. The PNG is listed in package-data so the Docker image carries it.

Trusted devices: a 2FA sign-in offers "Don't ask for the code on this device
in future". Ticked with a correct code, the browser gets its own HttpOnly
trusted-device cookie (token in Redis, 90 days, renewed on use); later
sign-ins to the same account from that browser need only the password. Other
accounts and browsers are unaffected. The trust is revoked on a password
reset, when 2FA is turned off, and when an admin blocks or deletes the user;
signing out keeps it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 21:02:44 +02:00

201 lines
7.0 KiB
Python

"""Registration, authentication, and login rate limiting (SPEC §6.1)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import uuid
from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import insert as pg_insert
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.config import get_settings
from app.identity.handles import InvalidHandle, full_handle, normalize_localpart
from app.identity.passwords import hash_password, verify_password
from app.models import AppSettings, User
from app.redis_client import get_redis
# SPEC §6.1: 10 attempts / 15 min per handle AND per IP.
_RL_MAX = 10
_RL_WINDOW = 15 * 60
class RegistrationError(Exception):
"""Registration failed for a user-actionable reason."""
def __init__(self, code: str, message: str) -> None:
super().__init__(message)
self.code = code
self.message = message
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RegistrationStatus:
"""What the signup page may offer right now."""
open: bool
# True when the instance has no users: the next signup creates the administrator.
bootstrap: bool
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RateLimited(Exception):
"""Raised when the login rate limit is exceeded."""
retry_after: int
class TotpRequired(Exception):
"""Password verified but the account has 2FA enabled and no code was given."""
class TotpInvalid(Exception):
"""Password verified but the supplied TOTP code was wrong."""
class AccountBlocked(Exception):
"""Password verified but an administrator has blocked the account."""
def resolve_handle(handle_input: str) -> str:
"""Normalize a login identifier to the full ``localpart@APP_DOMAIN`` form."""
text = handle_input.strip().lower()
if "@" in text:
return text
return f"{normalize_localpart(text)}@{get_settings().app_domain}"
async def app_settings(db: AsyncSession, *, for_update: bool = False) -> AppSettings:
"""Load the singleton settings row, creating it if an old database lacks one.
``for_update`` takes a row lock, which is what serialises concurrent signups.
A row conjured here defaults to *closed*: the safe answer when we cannot tell
what the operator intended.
"""
stmt = select(AppSettings).where(AppSettings.id == 1)
row = await db.scalar(stmt.with_for_update() if for_update else stmt)
if row is None:
await db.execute(
pg_insert(AppSettings).values(id=1, registration_open=False).on_conflict_do_nothing()
)
row = await db.scalar(stmt.with_for_update() if for_update else stmt)
assert row is not None # just inserted in this transaction
return row
async def _has_users(db: AsyncSession) -> bool:
return await db.scalar(select(User.id).limit(1)) is not None
async def registration_status(db: AsyncSession) -> RegistrationStatus:
"""Whether signup is currently accepted, and whether it would bootstrap an admin."""
bootstrap = not await _has_users(db)
settings = await app_settings(db)
return RegistrationStatus(open=bootstrap or settings.registration_open, bootstrap=bootstrap)
async def register_user(
db: AsyncSession, *, localpart: str, password: str, recovery_email: str | None
) -> User:
"""Create a new user. Raises :class:`RegistrationError` on validation/uniqueness.
The first user on an empty instance is always allowed and becomes the
administrator, which closes registration behind them; after that it takes an
admin reopening it. The settings row is locked across the whole decision so
two simultaneous first signups cannot both see an empty table and both claim
administrator.
"""
try:
handle = full_handle(localpart)
except InvalidHandle as exc:
raise RegistrationError(exc.code, exc.message) from exc
settings = await app_settings(db, for_update=True)
bootstrap = not await _has_users(db)
if not bootstrap and not settings.registration_open:
raise RegistrationError("registration_closed", "registration is closed on this server")
user = User(
handle=handle,
password_hash=hash_password(password),
recovery_email=(recovery_email.strip().lower() if recovery_email else None),
is_admin=bootstrap,
# Snapshotted at creation: later changes to the instance default leave
# this user's quota alone.
quota_bytes=settings.default_quota_bytes,
)
db.add(user)
try:
await db.flush()
except IntegrityError as exc:
await db.rollback()
raise RegistrationError("handle_taken", "that handle is already registered") from exc
if bootstrap:
settings.registration_open = False
return user
async def _bump_rate_limit(key: str) -> int:
redis = get_redis()
count = await redis.incr(key)
if count == 1:
await redis.expire(key, _RL_WINDOW)
return int(count)
async def _check_rate_limit(handle: str, ip: str) -> None:
for key in (f"rl:login:handle:{handle}", f"rl:login:ip:{ip}"):
count = await _bump_rate_limit(key)
if count > _RL_MAX:
ttl = await get_redis().ttl(key)
raise RateLimited(retry_after=max(ttl, 1))
async def authenticate(
db: AsyncSession,
*,
handle_input: str,
password: str,
ip: str,
totp: str | None = None,
trusted_device: Callable[[uuid.UUID], Awaitable[bool]] | None = None,
) -> User | None:
"""Verify credentials (constant-time). Returns the user or None; may rate-limit.
When the account has TOTP enabled, raises :class:`TotpRequired` (no code given)
or :class:`TotpInvalid` (wrong code) after the password check passes — unless
``trusted_device`` says this browser was trusted for the account at an earlier
2FA sign-in, in which case the password is enough.
"""
handle = resolve_handle(handle_input)
await _check_rate_limit(handle, ip)
user = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.handle == handle))
# Always run a verify to keep timing uniform whether or not the user exists.
stored_hash = user.password_hash if user else _DUMMY_HASH
ok = verify_password(stored_hash, password)
if user is None or not ok:
return None
# Only after the password: a stranger must not learn that a handle is blocked.
if user.blocked_at is not None:
raise AccountBlocked
if user.totp_secret is not None:
from app.identity.totp import decrypt_totp_secret
from app.identity.totp import verify as verify_totp
if not totp and trusted_device is not None and await trusted_device(user.id):
return user
if not totp:
raise TotpRequired
if not verify_totp(decrypt_totp_secret(user.totp_secret), totp):
raise TotpInvalid
return user
# A precomputed hash so authentication of a non-existent handle still spends
# argon2 time (mitigates user-enumeration via timing, SPEC §6.1 constant-time).
_DUMMY_HASH = hash_password("x" * 24)