lukasandClaude Opus 4.8
4e077f1a37
Backend foundation for the plugin platform (SPEC §11), Phases 1-3.
Phase 1 — SDK + loader:
- app/plugins/types.py: frozen Plugin/UiManifest/Slot/Page/JobSpec contract.
- app/plugins/sdk.py: sdk(name) facade — the only app.* import allowed for plugins
(scoped session, plugin.{name}.* publish, blob, outbox, settings, SSRF http_get, KV, enqueue).
- app/plugins/loader.py: entry-point discovery (webmail.plugins), hook forwarding
(API + worker), router mounting at /api/plugins/{name}, ui-manifest aggregation.
- plugin_kv core table (migration 0013) + GET /api/plugins/ui-manifest.
Phase 2 — non-removable core plugins + DB-enforced privacy:
- builtin flag (calendar/contacts will be builtin=True; uninstall refuses them).
- RLS per-user isolation on plg_* tables: least-privilege webmail_plugin role
(migration 0014), plugin_session(user_id) sets LOCAL ROLE + app.current_user_id,
rls.enable_rls() (ENABLE+FORCE RLS + USING/WITH CHECK policy). Mail untouched.
- Per-plugin Alembic runner (shared env, dedicated version table) + install/uninstall
--drop-data CLI; skeleton fixture proves install -> run -> uninstall --drop-data
leaves zero residue (§12 M3 acceptance).
Phase 3 — plugin jobs (§11.2):
- JobSpec registered as arq function plg.{plugin}.{func} + cron (5-field parser);
singleton=True guarded by a per-(plugin,user) Redis lock; wired onto the shared
interactive worker.
Gates: ruff, mypy --strict (94 files + tests), full suite 326 passed. RLS isolation,
migration round-trip, and singleton lock covered by tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rcj3TpydMTzTSmU7kunzf8
85 lines
3.2 KiB
Python
85 lines
3.2 KiB
Python
"""Row-Level Security enforcement for plugin tables (SPEC §11.1 + privacy).
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Proves that per-user isolation is enforced by Postgres — not by the query — so a
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plugin that forgets ``WHERE user_id`` still cannot read or write another user's
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rows. Requires the ``webmail_plugin`` role (migration 0014) to be applied.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import uuid
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import pytest
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from sqlalchemy import text
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from app.db import session_scope
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from app.plugins.db import plugin_session
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from app.plugins.rls import rls_ddl
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from app.plugins.sdk import sdk
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TABLE = "plg_rlsdemo_note"
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async def _create_demo_table() -> None:
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async with session_scope() as s:
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await s.execute(text(f"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {TABLE}"))
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await s.execute(
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text(
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f"CREATE TABLE {TABLE} ("
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"id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), "
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"user_id uuid NOT NULL, body text)"
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)
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)
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for stmt in rls_ddl(TABLE):
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await s.execute(text(stmt))
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async def test_rls_enforces_per_user_isolation() -> None:
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user_a, user_b = uuid.uuid4(), uuid.uuid4()
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await _create_demo_table()
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try:
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# Seed one row per user as the privileged role (superuser bypasses RLS).
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async with session_scope() as s:
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await s.execute(
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text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'a-note')"),
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{"u": str(user_a)},
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)
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b_id = (
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await s.execute(
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text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'b-note') RETURNING id"),
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{"u": str(user_b)},
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)
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).scalar_one()
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# Scoped to user A: the query has NO user filter, yet only A's row is visible.
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async with plugin_session(user_a) as s:
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assert (await s.execute(text("SELECT current_user"))).scalar_one() == "webmail_plugin"
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visible = (await s.execute(text(f"SELECT user_id FROM {TABLE}"))).scalars().all()
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assert set(visible) == {user_a}
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# IDOR blocked: fetching B's row by its exact id returns nothing.
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got = (
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await s.execute(text(f"SELECT id FROM {TABLE} WHERE id = :i"), {"i": str(b_id)})
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).first()
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assert got is None
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# WITH CHECK: A cannot insert a row owned by B (error aborts the txn).
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with pytest.raises(Exception, match="row-level security"):
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async with plugin_session(user_a) as s:
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await s.execute(
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text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'forged')"),
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{"u": str(user_b)},
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)
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# A can write its own rows via the SDK session; B's data stays invisible.
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async with sdk("demo").session(user_a) as s:
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await s.execute(
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text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'a-note-2')"),
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{"u": str(user_a)},
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)
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async with plugin_session(user_a) as s:
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count = (await s.execute(text(f"SELECT count(*) FROM {TABLE}"))).scalar_one()
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assert count == 2 # both of A's rows, none of B's
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finally:
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async with session_scope() as s:
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await s.execute(text(f"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {TABLE}"))
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