Security hardening from the assessment; testing fixes
Security (ultimo-security-report.md):
- Security headers on every response, the app shell included: they lived at
server level and nginx dropped them in any location with its own header.
CSP, framing, nosniff, referrer, permissions (docker/nginx-security.conf).
- Plain HTTP forwarded by the reverse proxy is redirected to HTTPS; HSTS on
HTTPS responses. server_tokens off.
- Cross-site state-changing /api requests refused (login CSRF), WebSocket too.
- Validation errors in the usual error shape, without the request model.
- New-password policy: max 128, common/own-address/repeated refused,
breached-password check (HIBP k-anonymity, fails open).
- Message HTML: links keep only http(s)/mailto (sanitizer v6); the HTML
endpoint carries its own no-script CSP.
- Outbound fetches pinned to the checked IP (DNS rebinding); external
IMAP/SMTP servers re-checked before each connection; CGNAT and mapped
addresses counted as non-public.
Fixes from testing:
- IDLE loop catches up before idling: mail that came while the worker was
away no longer waits up to 10 minutes.
- Restore from Spam/Trash/Archive moves only the removed messages, not your
reply in Sent.
- Narrow desktop list stacks sender/subject/snippet (subject was squeezed
to nothing at the default width), with hover actions.
- Phone: wide emails scale to fit the screen.
- Singular forms ("1 message"); no zip button for a single attachment;
app passwords no longer claim "never used" for mail apps.
- ruff format across the backend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@ map $http_x_forwarded_proto $fwd_proto {
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http http;
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}
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# HSTS only for requests that came in over HTTPS (nginx-security.conf).
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map $fwd_proto $hsts {
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https "max-age=31536000";
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default "";
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}
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# No nginx version in the Server header or on error pages.
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server_tokens off;
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# Connection header for the WebSocket upgrade dance on /api/ws.
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map $http_upgrade $connection_upgrade {
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default upgrade;
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@@ -44,6 +53,13 @@ server {
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listen 80;
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server_name _;
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# The reverse proxy in front (DSM) terminates TLS and says how the browser
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# came in. Plain HTTP from the internet goes to HTTPS; a request with no
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# such header (LAN access straight to WEB_PORT) is left alone.
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if ($http_x_forwarded_proto = "http") {
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return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
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}
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# Regex locations beat prefix ones, so this wins over `location /api/`
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# regardless of order. `(/|$)` keeps it to /api/admin and /api/admin/...,
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# never a future /api/administrators. 404 rather than 403: a port open to
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@@ -76,6 +92,7 @@ server {
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location = /admin.html {
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add_header Cache-Control "no-store, must-revalidate";
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include /etc/nginx/webmail-security.conf;
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}
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# SPA fallback -> the admin panel. `/` on this port IS the panel; the mail
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