Security hardening from the assessment; testing fixes

Security (ultimo-security-report.md):
- Security headers on every response, the app shell included: they lived at
  server level and nginx dropped them in any location with its own header.
  CSP, framing, nosniff, referrer, permissions (docker/nginx-security.conf).
- Plain HTTP forwarded by the reverse proxy is redirected to HTTPS; HSTS on
  HTTPS responses. server_tokens off.
- Cross-site state-changing /api requests refused (login CSRF), WebSocket too.
- Validation errors in the usual error shape, without the request model.
- New-password policy: max 128, common/own-address/repeated refused,
  breached-password check (HIBP k-anonymity, fails open).
- Message HTML: links keep only http(s)/mailto (sanitizer v6); the HTML
  endpoint carries its own no-script CSP.
- Outbound fetches pinned to the checked IP (DNS rebinding); external
  IMAP/SMTP servers re-checked before each connection; CGNAT and mapped
  addresses counted as non-public.

Fixes from testing:
- IDLE loop catches up before idling: mail that came while the worker was
  away no longer waits up to 10 minutes.
- Restore from Spam/Trash/Archive moves only the removed messages, not your
  reply in Sent.
- Narrow desktop list stacks sender/subject/snippet (subject was squeezed
  to nothing at the default width), with hover actions.
- Phone: wide emails scale to fit the screen.
- Singular forms ("1 message"); no zip button for a single attachment;
  app passwords no longer claim "never used" for mail apps.
- ruff format across the backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-14 22:08:06 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 30b806e7da
commit addb2232a1
54 changed files with 1265 additions and 187 deletions
+1 -3
View File
@@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ async def test_meili_typo_tolerance_and_filters() -> None:
await backend.index(_doc(user_id))
# Acceptance (§12 M2): a typo still finds the message.
hits, _c = await backend.query(
to_search_query("invocie", user_id), limit=10, cursor=None
)
hits, _c = await backend.query(to_search_query("invocie", user_id), limit=10, cursor=None)
if not hits: # wait for the async index task
assert await _poll(backend, "invocie", user_id) == 1
hits, _c = await backend.query(
+6 -2
View File
@@ -159,8 +159,12 @@ async def test_search_excludes_trash_by_default(ctx: Ctx) -> None:
ctx.session.add(trash)
await ctx.session.flush()
await _ingest(
ctx, frm="X <x@corp.com>", subject="zephyr in trash", body="bye",
mailbox_id=trash.id, special="trash",
ctx,
frm="X <x@corp.com>",
subject="zephyr in trash",
body="bye",
mailbox_id=trash.id,
special="trash",
)
assert await _search(ctx, "zephyr") == 1 # inbox only; the trashed one is hidden
assert await _search(ctx, "in:trash zephyr") == 1 # explicit -> searches Trash