Security hardening from the assessment; testing fixes

Security (ultimo-security-report.md):
- Security headers on every response, the app shell included: they lived at
  server level and nginx dropped them in any location with its own header.
  CSP, framing, nosniff, referrer, permissions (docker/nginx-security.conf).
- Plain HTTP forwarded by the reverse proxy is redirected to HTTPS; HSTS on
  HTTPS responses. server_tokens off.
- Cross-site state-changing /api requests refused (login CSRF), WebSocket too.
- Validation errors in the usual error shape, without the request model.
- New-password policy: max 128, common/own-address/repeated refused,
  breached-password check (HIBP k-anonymity, fails open).
- Message HTML: links keep only http(s)/mailto (sanitizer v6); the HTML
  endpoint carries its own no-script CSP.
- Outbound fetches pinned to the checked IP (DNS rebinding); external
  IMAP/SMTP servers re-checked before each connection; CGNAT and mapped
  addresses counted as non-public.

Fixes from testing:
- IDLE loop catches up before idling: mail that came while the worker was
  away no longer waits up to 10 minutes.
- Restore from Spam/Trash/Archive moves only the removed messages, not your
  reply in Sent.
- Narrow desktop list stacks sender/subject/snippet (subject was squeezed
  to nothing at the default width), with hover actions.
- Phone: wide emails scale to fit the screen.
- Singular forms ("1 message"); no zip button for a single attachment;
  app passwords no longer claim "never used" for mail apps.
- ruff format across the backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-14 22:08:06 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 30b806e7da
commit addb2232a1
54 changed files with 1265 additions and 187 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ async def restore_thread_job(ctx: dict[str, Any], thread_id: str) -> None:
Each message returns to ``restore_mailbox_id`` (the folder it was in before it
was archived/trashed) — e.g. a deleted Sent message goes back to Sent. Messages
with no recorded origin fall back to the account's Inbox.
with no recorded origin fall back to the account's Inbox. Only messages in
Archive, Trash or Spam move: the thread's others (your reply in Sent) stay.
"""
tid = uuid.UUID(thread_id)
async with session_scope() as session:
@@ -319,10 +320,13 @@ async def restore_thread_job(ctx: dict[str, Any], thread_id: str) -> None:
await session.scalars(select(Mailbox).where(Mailbox.account_id.in_(account_ids)))
)
path_by_id = {mb.id: mb.path for mb in mailboxes}
removal_ids = {mb.id for mb in mailboxes if mb.special_use in _REMOVAL_FOLDERS}
inbox_by_account = {mb.account_id: mb.id for mb in mailboxes if mb.special_use == "inbox"}
# (message_id, account_id, source_path, target_id) — resolve the target now.
plan: list[tuple[uuid.UUID, uuid.UUID, str, uuid.UUID, int]] = []
for m in messages:
if m.mailbox_id not in removal_ids:
continue # never removed: nothing to restore
target_id = m.restore_mailbox_id
if target_id is None or target_id not in path_by_id:
target_id = inbox_by_account.get(m.account_id)