85 lines
3.2 KiB
Python
85 lines
3.2 KiB
Python
 
|
"""Row-Level Security enforcement for plugin tables (SPEC §11.1 + privacy).
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Proves that per-user isolation is enforced by Postgres — not by the query — so a
|
||
|
|
plugin that forgets ``WHERE user_id`` still cannot read or write another user's
|
||
|
|
rows. Requires the ``webmail_plugin`` role (migration 0014) to be applied.
|
||
|
|
"""
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
import uuid
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
import pytest
|
||
|
|
from sqlalchemy import text
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
from app.db import session_scope
|
||
|
|
from app.plugins.db import plugin_session
|
||
|
|
from app.plugins.rls import rls_ddl
|
||
|
|
from app.plugins.sdk import sdk
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
TABLE = "plg_rlsdemo_note"
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
async def _create_demo_table() -> None:
|
||
|
|
async with session_scope() as s:
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(text(f"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {TABLE}"))
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(
|
||
|
|
text(
|
||
|
|
f"CREATE TABLE {TABLE} ("
|
||
|
|
"id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(), "
|
||
|
|
"user_id uuid NOT NULL, body text)"
|
||
|
|
)
|
||
|
|
)
|
||
|
|
for stmt in rls_ddl(TABLE):
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(text(stmt))
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
async def test_rls_enforces_per_user_isolation() -> None:
|
||
|
|
user_a, user_b = uuid.uuid4(), uuid.uuid4()
|
||
|
|
await _create_demo_table()
|
||
|
|
try:
|
||
|
|
# Seed one row per user as the privileged role (superuser bypasses RLS).
|
||
|
|
async with session_scope() as s:
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(
|
||
|
|
text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'a-note')"),
|
||
|
|
{"u": str(user_a)},
|
||
|
|
)
|
||
|
|
b_id = (
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(
|
||
|
|
text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'b-note') RETURNING id"),
|
||
|
|
{"u": str(user_b)},
|
||
|
|
)
|
||
|
|
).scalar_one()
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# Scoped to user A: the query has NO user filter, yet only A's row is visible.
|
||
|
|
async with plugin_session(user_a) as s:
|
||
|
|
assert (await s.execute(text("SELECT current_user"))).scalar_one() == "webmail_plugin"
|
||
|
|
visible = (await s.execute(text(f"SELECT user_id FROM {TABLE}"))).scalars().all()
|
||
|
|
assert set(visible) == {user_a}
|
||
|
|
# IDOR blocked: fetching B's row by its exact id returns nothing.
|
||
|
|
got = (
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(text(f"SELECT id FROM {TABLE} WHERE id = :i"), {"i": str(b_id)})
|
||
|
|
).first()
|
||
|
|
assert got is None
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# WITH CHECK: A cannot insert a row owned by B (error aborts the txn).
|
||
|
|
with pytest.raises(Exception, match="row-level security"):
|
||
|
|
async with plugin_session(user_a) as s:
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(
|
||
|
|
text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'forged')"),
|
||
|
|
{"u": str(user_b)},
|
||
|
|
)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# A can write its own rows via the SDK session; B's data stays invisible.
|
||
|
|
async with sdk("demo").session(user_a) as s:
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(
|
||
|
|
text(f"INSERT INTO {TABLE}(user_id, body) VALUES (:u, 'a-note-2')"),
|
||
|
|
{"u": str(user_a)},
|
||
|
|
)
|
||
|
|
async with plugin_session(user_a) as s:
|
||
|
|
count = (await s.execute(text(f"SELECT count(*) FROM {TABLE}"))).scalar_one()
|
||
|
|
assert count == 2 # both of A's rows, none of B's
|
||
|
|
finally:
|
||
|
|
async with session_scope() as s:
|
||
|
|
await s.execute(text(f"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {TABLE}"))
|